There are more than 12,000 kilometers between China and Mexico

Lula, Boric, and Petro, ideologically aligned with Sheinbaum, are moving closer to China, but Mexico has reasons to keep its distance.
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The day has come when tariff developments have become part of our daily routine: headlines from around the world are no longer enough to keep up with Washington’s threats and Beijing’s responses—the expressions of the trade war between the United States and China, with Donald Trump as its main promoter. The importance of China’s investment, technology, and political, cultural, and educational influence in Latin America is increasingly evident. China has expanded its presence in the region through trade agreements, infrastructure projects, and soft power strategies such as the Confucius Institute. The five Latin American countries that receive the most Chinese investment are Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Ecuador—an undoubtedly relevant fact today.

The presidents of Brazil, Colombia, and Chile—Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Gustavo Petro, and Gabriel Boric, respectively—are leading delegations from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) on a visit to China to strengthen trade ties and explore alternatives. These visits coincide with the fourth meeting of foreign ministers of the China-CELAC Forum, a mechanism created in the wake of the left’s victories in the region during the first decade of this century.

How is Mexico navigating the tariff war? The first turbulence was felt in February, when it faced a 25% tariff on all Mexican imports. This measure was the United States’ latest response to the public health crisis caused by fentanyl consumption and Mexico’s perceived inaction against drug trafficking. The move sparked outrage, and some even suggested that Mexico should not turn its back on China. Social media, meanwhile, was flooded with hastily written takes—as if it were a matter of “if it’s not Chana, it’s Juana.” However, President Claudia Sheinbaum has voiced concern over the huge trade imbalance with China and has made it clear that the United States remains Mexico’s top trading priority.

Chinese investment has undoubtedly grown. Capital injections are always welcome, and from 2006 to 2024, direct investment reached $2.549 billion, although government sources acknowledge that figures are likely underreported. China has developed infrastructure in Mexico, particularly in industrial parks in areas like Nuevo León, Baja California, the State of Mexico, Coahuila, and Chihuahua. Notably, most of these investments occurred between 2018 and 2024—during the initial phase of the tariff war between the global powers. In this context, China was incentivized to establish operations in Mexico to benefit from its proximity to the United States and the advantages of exporting through the USMCA, thereby avoiding tariff barriers. This, unsurprisingly, has not pleased the U.S.: the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has already expressed concern about the level of Chinese investment in Mexico’s automotive sector.

The game board changes within weeks. We have already seen Trump’s tariff storm shift toward the rest of the world—with a particular focus on China—while Mexico has remained relatively steady under the protective framework of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Diplomacy has played its part in securing a favorable position for Mexico. But if we’ve learned anything lately, it’s that uncertainty is here to stay, and daily developments rarely determine the final outcome.

In any case, and acknowledging the need to reassess our view of the Asian giant, Mexico would do well to consider factors like geographic proximity, shared democratic values, and strong trade ties with the United States—none of which exist with China. It’s a truism that Mexico’s relationship with the U.S. didn’t start with Trump. Migration, which remains a humanitarian crisis, is the first issue that comes to mind. However, the progress, cooperation, and growth brought by trade allow us to assess this relationship with more light than shadow. Unlike her leftist counterparts in South America, who are more open to alternatives, President Sheinbaum has prioritized the U.S.

She is right: it is preferable to commit to the USMCA and to North American trade integration under its framework. Mexico has positioned itself as the United States’ leading trading partner, developed an attractive investment profile, and become more competitive with China. It is only logical, then, that the Mexican government’s strategy leans toward strengthening ties with the U.S. while pulling away from China. As Jorge Guajardo, former Mexican ambassador to China, has noted, the U.S. shutting its doors to its rival benefits Mexico, as China directly competes with it commercially. Favoring our northern neighbor isn’t about getting along with whoever occupies the White House—it’s about protecting our interests. For example, in 2024 alone, Mexico imported more than $129 billion in goods from China but exported only $9.932 billion. This imbalance explains Sheinbaum’s aforementioned complaint.

But beyond this particular scenario, why should Mexico be concerned about China’s advance in the region? Because of its track record in the rest of Latin America, where the Eastern power’s growing presence follows a clear, phased strategy. First came extractivist activity, then large-scale infrastructure projects. More recently, China’s expansion has become more sophisticated, as seen in its leadership in technology and digital commerce.

No less concerning is China’s support for authoritarian governments like those in Venezuela and Nicaragua, under the pretext of respecting national sovereignty—part of its strategy to assert itself as a global power. It’s worth noting that, according to Freedom in the World (2025), China is classified as “not free.” This confirms what we already know: in China, there is no independent civil society, no freedom of expression, association, assembly, or religion, and human rights defenders and critics of the regime are persecuted. This is a dangerous model for Mexico, where institutions that protect civil society are being progressively weakened. While the U.S. may exhibit authoritarian tendencies, it cannot be compared to China, and such signs do not turn the world’s leading power into a dictatorship.

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